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RECONCEPTUALISING THE MEDIA AUDIENCE
by
DAVE MORLEY
V/hat I am .going to deal with in this papec_iice_jsonje. gf_.the_jjnplications 
of the realisation^— wiiJoin mass media research, that one cannot approach 
the-jacoblem of the ' effect s^~~oTT'the .media on the audience as if the contents 
of the media.impinged directly on to passive minds. The realisation that 
people in fact assimilate, select from and reject 'communications' from 
the media has led to the development of the 'uses and gratifications' model 
•f the media, Halloran advising us that "we must get away fj'om the habit 
of thinking in terms of what the media do to people and substitute for it 
the idea of what people do with the media." This approach highlights the- 
important fact that different members of ~the media audience may 'use’ and 
interpret any particular programme in a quite different way from how the 
communicator intended it, and in quite, different way* fronfc other members 
of the audience. ' J-l-
, ;  - r "  ‘  • ’  . . . . . . .  — . - • * * * "
As Stuart Hall argues in "Encoding and decoding tne TV Message" this entails 
a recognition of the fundamentally pfolysemic nature of the message - by 
the sheer fact that- the message can be interpreted in a number of different 
ways, by 'mapping it into' different connotative configurations or maps 
of meaning. But, as he goes on to argue: "Polysemy must not be confused 
with pluralism. Connotative codes are not equal-among, themselvesi Any 
society/culture tends, with varying degrees of closure, to impose its 
segmentations, its classifications of the social and cultural and 
political world, npoti its members. There remains a dominant cultural 
order, though it is neither univocal or uncdntested*" (pil^). ThesA 
'closures' of the message dire the means by which the audietlce is directed 
towards' a reading of the message in terms of the preferred or dominant 
meanings - for example, the way in which the 3poken commentary in a nev^ 
broadcast- -directs us towards a particular* -interpretation of the visual v 
images on the screen:— 'although there can be no law to ensure that the 
receiver will take the preferred, or dominant meaning of an episode . * • * 
in precisely the way in which it has been encoded by the producer' (SH op,cit«)
Ve need to break fundamentally with the |uses and gratifications' approach, 
with its psychologistic problematic and its emphasis on individnal 
differences of interpretation. Of course, there will always be individual 
'private' readings; but we need to see the way in which these readings 
are patterned into cultural structures and clusters. What jls needed here
is an approach which links differential interpretations bade to the socio-
; • • • :
economic structure of society - showing how members of different groups 
and classes, sharing different 'cultural codes' will interpret a given 
message differently, not just at the level of idiosyncratic personal 
differences of- interpretation, but in a way systematically related to their 
socio-economic position., In short we need to see how the different 
sub-cultural structures and formations within the audience, and the .
sharing of different cultural codes and competencies amongst different groups 
and classes, determines ‘the decoding of the message for different sections 
of the audinece. .
We can usefully begin an analysis of the situation of the media audience 
in relation to the message by looking at the role of the education system, 
since the education system, is a key determinant of the levels and kinds of 
cultural codes and competencies^acquired by the audience. No other 
ideological apparatus of the state has the obligatory audience of the 
totality of the children in a capitalist social formation 7 hours a 
day for 5 days a week, during the most2vulnerable years of their 
development. As Baudelot and Establet argue in their book, 'L'ecole 
Capitaliste en France' (trans. John Downing): "The other ideological.
apparattweeu-CbourgeOTrs-par-ties,' TV, advertising * the-church, etc,) which 
operate either simultaneously or later on, are only enabled to fulfill 
their function of ideological domination on the basis of the primary 
conditioning realised by the educational apparatus. The educational 
apparatus therefore occupies a.privileged position in the superstructure 
of the capitalist mode of production, since it is the only one out of alj. 
the ideological apparatuses to inculcate the dominant ideology on the 
basis of the formation of labour power".
The education-system structures the audiences of the different sections 
of the media. There is a Close correlation between degrees of education 
and choices'of media materials--the audience of the 'quality press' and 
their TV equivalents (in the form of documentaries, etc.) is largely 
coextensive with that group of people who have been educated beyond the., 
minimum age. Thus, the media reflect and reinforce the levels of public 
discussion'institutionalised by: the education system^ • * i:.
The fact that only an: educated minority possess the cultural competencies 
necessary to. appropriate the products of those sections of the media which 
provide more detailed and explanatory accounts of developments in society ... 
has a clear parallel with the aspect of the situation pointed to by Pierre 
Bourdieu in his essay on 'Cultural Reproduction & Social Reproduction':
"The inheritance-of cultural wealth which has been accumulated and 
bequeathed by. previous generations only really belongs (though it is 
theoretically offered to everyone) to those endowed with the means of 
appropriating it for themselves ... the apprehension and possession of 
cultural goods as symbolic goods are only possible for those who hold the 
code making.-it possible to decipher then^ (p«73) ,
* t„ •. ' > • { • ’ • • . • ...
Indeed, Bourdieu points to the existence of "an extremely pronounced 
relationship'-' (p.76) between the level of education and participation 
in all. forms-of prestigious cultural activities. Thus he sees the 
education system as the prime agent of distribution of the cultural 
competencies necessary for these activities. Hoever, he goes on to argue 
that the determination of educatiqnal achievement lies-in the prior process ; 
of primary socialisation in the family - he argues that what is necessary • • 
for educational success is "linguistic and cultural competency and that 
relationship of familiarity with culture which can only he produced by 
family upbringing when it transmits the dominant ^ culture*." (p„80).
This argument is obviously similar to that of-Basil Bemstei»t and it will 
now be necessary for us to attempt to come~to grips- with H-i.a approach to 
education and the'transmission-of culture.
Bernstein’s concern is with the distribution of-cultural competencies 
throughout society; he distinguishes between two basic forms.of competency? 
restricted code and elaborated code £"these codes can be seen as different 
kinds of communicative competence.." - Class, Codes & Control, Paladin, 1973-, 
(p.l68), which he says are characteristic, in the main, of the working class, 
and middle class respectively, and he locates the origin of these different ’ 
codes in the different family styles of socialisation of these classes. 
Bernstein's basic thesis cjin be represented schematically thus:
*  y r . r
3CLASS 'AMILY TYPE STYLE OF SOCIALISATION CODE MODE OF UNDERSTANDING
working
class
positional 
role system
closed mode of 
communication 
and control
restricted rigid
particularistic 
context-bound 
implicit
middle
class
personal 
role system
jpen mode of 
coramun icat i on 
and control
elaborated flexible 
universalist ic 
context-free 
explicit
Bernstein himself offers a summary of (one variant of) his thesis in "A 
sociolinguistic approach to socialisation ..." (Bernstein op.cit. p.l88/9):
"We started with the view that the social organisation and sub-culture of 
the lower working class would be likely to generate a distinctive form of 
communication through which the genes of social class would be transmitted. 
Secondly, two general types of linguistic codes were postulated and their 
social origins and regulative consequences were analysed. Thirdly, it was 
suggested that the sub-culture of the lower working class would be transmitted 
through a restricted code while that of the middle class would realise both 
elaborated and restricted codes. This causal link was considered to be very- 
imprecise and omitted the dynamics of the process .. (So) .. the fourth step 
entailed the construction of two types of family role systems, positional and 
personal, their causally related 'open' and ’closed' communications systems 
and their procedures of sodSLal control. Hie fifth step made the causal link 
between restricted and elaborated codes and their two modes with positional- 
a*d person-oriented family, role systems ..."
Thus Bernstein introduces family type as the crucial intermediary variable 
between class and code. He says, (op.cit. p.176):" I shall now look at the 
relationships between role systems and linguistic codes, as the connection 
between social class and linguistic codes is too imprecise. Such a relation­
ship omits the dynamics of the causal relationship. In order to examine these 
dynamics it is necessary to look at the nature of the role system and its 
procedures of social control."
However, the link between class and code is at times almost qualified out of 
existence, as the link between class and family type is qualified (see p.l86 
and 270) so that positional and personal family types may be found in both ' 
middle class and working class, while the link between family type and mode 
of control is qualified so that "in any one family, or even in any one context of 
control, all 3 modes of control may be used." Thus, at most, the working class 
tends to be characterised by a positional type of family which tends to use a 
closed mode of communication and control. Further, of course, the restricted 
code is to be found among the middle class too, so the codes are not exclusive 
to the two classes, although it is exceptional, in this schema, to find the 
elaborated code among the working class.
As against the emphasis of Bernstein's argument, I would claim that if we 
■notice that working class children have a set of negative predispositions 
towards the school - such as self-depreciation, devaluation of the school and 
H s  sanctions, a resigned attitude to failure - and that they are the carriers 
kt certain cultural traditions which make them hostile to the school and 
Result in their virtual self-elimination from the education system - then 
&  problem is to determine out of what past and present experience these
4cultural traditions and-pretfisposfcions a'ise and maintain ..themselves. _  
"Cultural values do not descend from hea en to influence the course of history. 
They are abstractions by ah observer, b«a ed on the observation.of pertain 
similarities in the way groups of people behave, either in different situations 
br over time or both. Even though cne c n often make accurate predictions 
about the way groups an<T~iKdividual# wi-1 - --behave, oyer short periods of time 
on the basis of such abstractions, as su h they do not explain the behaviour.
To explain,-behaviour in terms, of-culture . values is to engage in circular 
■reasoning.'." (Barrington Moore - Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, 
!p.486)r  • ■- . .... .. ..
*\T r-
Ihus, the negative predispositions of worcing class children towards the school 
j^t_be_understood, as Bourdieu says (oj cit. p.83) j .......
n'as an anticipation, based upon the unco ’scious estimation "df^the objective^---
probabilities of success possessed by th < whole category, of the - sanctions 
objectively-reserved by the school for +■ toss classes deprived of cultural 
'capital! .u... (Thus) the functionalist sc '.iologists who, armcunce. the. bjTdve new 
world wheir,;ht the conclusion of a longi udinal survey of, academic. and social 
careers, they discover that, as though b/ a' pre-established,harmony. individuals 
had hoped for .nothing that they had not achieved, and.obtained nothing that 
they have not hoped for, are simply the .east forgivable victims of the 
ideological effp.pt which is produced by he school -when it cuts off from their
social conditions of production all ▼w**'*-- ‘' _cri2 rc;arding the school such
•expectations1 'aspira-’-ic.i^  ... and i ms  tends to cover up the fact thatas
objective conditions - and iri the indivi iual case, the laws of the academic 
market determine aspirations'by determ ning the extent to which they can 
be satisfied." F
John Downing, in his paper ’Recent Marxi t theories of Ideology* remarks that 
Baudelot.and Establet, in'their study of 'The Capitalist School in France’, 
conclude in a familiar vein that there i •< a virtual segregation in the French 
school apparatus between the 25% of achievers and the 75% of non-achievers.
But, he goes on "so far from arguing in "he usual circular fashion of many 
educational sociologists ... that the re.ison for this segregation.of achieve- 
.ment is that bourgeois and petit-bourgeois families have a cultural inheritance 
mechanise in their style’ primary socialisation, they insist that the primary 
origin of this schism in 'the growing generation is the division in the. 
capitalist labour market." .
Thus the structure of the education system is seen as being determined by 
the structure of the divisioh’-crC labour in society; ,fche educational apparatus 
is seen as being geared to the-reproduction of the conditions of production, 
which includes the need for manual workers, together, .with professionala and 
administrators, and the need for the right orientation to one’s place in *• 
production. The .structure of the education system is thus organised in guch 
a way as to reproduce the entire range of categories of workers, and this- 
takes placervia the definition and demarcation of ’types of child’ ; but rthe 
fact that there is an inheritance factor is derived from the primary reality 
of the: schism in the capitalist labour market, and not the other way round.
Bauds lot and Ea tab let point to the fact that at the top end of the educational 
aj>paratudj». in those sections that cater for the future holders of authority - 
positions inbourgois society, tho curricula encourage pupils to ’think., 
bourgeois, for themselves, to bo dbl-e independently to articulate and if necessary 
justify bourgeois perspectives, procedures and problematics. In the-lover 
segiona of the apparatus, catering for the majority destined to be ordinary 
workers, .the curricula tend rather to teach 'bourgeois ideas'as a given set,' 
without encouraging-pupils to arrive at cny-independent understanding <y, the
tlie id!fS’ nre.based- Ncw the difference pointed to here is 
’elaborated corfo'0/31' .dimension of Bernstein’s distinction $etwe««
t h ^  Principles are made explicit and individuals are
thus given access to the grounds of their experience - . . k
•f; r ?/•*•; . • t v
experience - grounds which they can then develop and change) and 'restricted 
code' (in whicrf prinicples are never made explicit and therefore are not 
made available to inspection and change). But the crucial difference here is 
that Baudelot ;and Establet locate the origin if this difference in different 
styles of teadking in the school, not in primary styles of family socialisation, 
and propose tkat the origin of the differegt styles of teaching lies in the 
structure of the capitalist labour market,. J
■ It
Hegemony an‘d Educability:
7
As Althusser has pointed out "It is in the forms and under the forms of 
ideologicad.: subjection that provision is made for the reproduction of the skills 
of labour power." This is a dimension of analysis which Bernstein simply does 
not fit irtto his system; indeed, the concept of hegemong nowhere figures in 
his analysis. Rosen remarks (Language and Class, p.6):
" ... strangest of all in this system, the ruling class do not figure at all.
When Befnstein talks of social control he is not talking about the ways in 
which arte class controls or is controlled by another, but only of the ways 
in which members of th same class control each other."
In his 1973 Postscript to Vol. 1 of Class, Codes and Control, Bernstein says 
that he has been "trying to do research into .. education as an agency of 
social control" (p.257). In his introduction to that volume he has lamented 
the fact that, in the end: "The left wing ... saw the work as .. an attempt 
at the ideological level at reducing the value of 'natural' forms of 
communication, and aimed at breaking these in order to impose middle class 
values and meaning more successfully in the schools." (p.37)
His argument is that:
"Hie school is necessarily concerned with the transmission and development of 
universalistic orders of meaning." (p.22l)
and against some interpretations of his thesis he claims that:
"The introduction of the child to the universalistic meanings of public forms 
of thought is not compensatory education - it is education. It is not in 
itself making children middle class .. (Though) .. The implicit values 
underlying the form and contents of the educational environment might." (p.225) 
Of course, as he' concedes:
"It is also the case that the school is implicitly and explicitly transmitting 
values and their attendant morality ... Further, these values and morals 
affect the content of educational know’^dge ... Thus the working class child 
may be placed at a considerable disadvantage in relation to the total 
culture of the school." ( p.222)
For:
"Many of the contexts of our schools a’*e unwittingly drawn from aspects of 
the symbolic world of the middle class " (p.225)
Yet, he maintains, crucially: ''r
i "Elaborated codes Eire not necessarily i iddle class communication procedures; ;\
! they are not necessarily instruments f< r the alienation of the working class;
I neither does it follow that they funct on as reproducers of a particular .,
! class structure ..." (p.262) .
\ Thus Bernstein holds that: '.;•//
j "Educational institutions are faced wirh the problem of encouraging children 
v to change and extend the way they natu ally use language ... (In terms of this 
i paper) .. this becomes a switch from restricted to elaborated c o d e g ( p . 189) 
i • ■•r-
JThe question is, what kind of a problet this is: whether it is a technical 
problem, to be situated in the problematic of 'educability', or a political
1
t.1r
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6problem to be situated in the problematic of 'hegemony', i would suggest ----- 
that there is a clear parallel with the situation pointed to by Stuart Hall 
(SH Ehcoding/Decoding op«cit. pp. 10-19):
"Wien dealing with social communications it is extremely difficult to 
identify as a neutral, educational goal, the task of 'improving communications' 
or of 'making communications more effective', at any rate once one has 
passed beyond the strictly denotative level of the message ... Denotative 
mistakes (in decoding -DM) are not structurally sigiiificant. But comotative 
and contextual 'misunderstandings' are, or can be, of the highest significance. 
To interpret what are ir fact essential elements in the syhtematip distortions 
of a socio-communications system as if they 'wore technical faults in trans­
mission is to misread a deep-structure' prrcessrfor a surface phenomenon.- 
The decision to intervene "ifT order to mak-^ r the hegemonic codes dominant 
elites more effective and transparent for the'raajci'rity', audience is not a 
technically neutral, but a political one.". ^
Similarly, Eco remarks,^ in his notes on the possibilities-of a "* semiotic 
guerilla warfare*, that: f ' • ' ;• \;i— ^
"The gap between the transmitted ant! the. received messages is not only an 
aberration, which needs to be reducad'- it can also be developed so as to 
broaden the receivers' freedom. In political activity, it is not indispensable 
to change a given message: it would be enough (or perhaps better) to change 
the attitude of the audience so as to introduce a different decoding of the 
message - or in order to isolate the intentions of the transmitter and tht*s 
to criticise them." (Eco in WPCS No->3, p. 121).
I would propose that Bernstein's position is not tenable when he claims -that 
"An elaborated code does not ent il any specific value .system" (p.212) - 
that,win short, the elaborated code is simply a superior cognitive technique.
He does qualify this by- saying that "The value system of the middle class does 
penetrate the texture of the very learning context itself" (p.212) - but thiq 
is seen as a contingent, and therefore in. principle, separable 'contamination1-^ 
While I would'not want to 'collapse1 the notion of education into that of 
ideological indoctrination, and while 1 would align myself with Rosen's 
proviso that "there are many aspects of language usually, acquired through 
education which, given favourable conditions, give access to more powerful 
ways of thinking" (Language & Class p.19), I would yet maintain that it is 
in the conceptual forms of the dominant ideology that the elaborated code 
is transmitted in the education system and that JLts ideological aspect is 
neither contingent ,-nor readily. separable.
Bernstein's attempted disavowal (in "A Critique of the concept of compensatory 
education") of some interpretations of his work, in terms of the cultural/ 
linguistic deprivation of working class children is, as Rosen argues, less 
than convincing - for Bernstein's theory claims that there is something 
lacking in working class language - elaborated code. Moreover, Rosen goes 
on, the * respect* Bernstein accords to .he restricted code has a hollow 
ring to it when 'rationality' is feacclu-.od from it: "restricted-codes draw 
upon metaphor, whereas elaborated eode.. draw upon rationality" (Language 
and Class p.l4). Bernstein's claim- (0 ,1 op.cit.,p.21l)that despite the diff- 
iculties involved, he is attempting 'ft avoid Implicit value judgements about 
the relative worth of speech .systems &-d the cultures which they*symbolise" 
is indicative of his failure to grasp ie. fact that questions of the 
'relative worth' of cultures- are *i»evi' ably political questions, that must 
be related to the structure of power society.
Thus Parkin notes (Class Inequality an Political Order, p.83): 10 
"Those groups in society which occupy -. 3sitions of the greatest-power 
and privilege will also tend to have t' 2 greatest access to the means of 
. legitimation .. the .s-xcial/political - fmitions of those in dominant 
positions tend to become objectified ar>^  enshrined in the major 
institutional orders, so providing the Moral framework of tha entire-social 
system .. dominant values tend to 3ot - 10 standards for what is considered
as SSSSi-’UtSr*
7tastes and pursuits of the subordinate classes are negatively evalu ated .. 
the characteristic speech patterns and linguistic usages of the dominant class 
are generally regarded as 'correct', or what counts as the grammar of the 
language .. and the usages of the subordinate class are often said to be 
incorrect or ungrammatical where they differ from the former, even though such 
usages represent the statistical norm".
As Nell Keddie argues in her introduction to "The Myth of Cultural Deprivation", 
our very notions of 'rationality', 'intelligence*' and 'educability' are 
themselves- socially constructed: "Logics are socially constructed.and 
socially situated among the group to whom they are the logical (or rational) ' 
way of thinking and doing. "She argues that the formal logic of western 
culture, far from being absolute, is no different in this respect from the 
logic of any other social group. This dominant culture provides us with our 
primary definitions of 'rationality', etc. and it is in terms of these 
definitions that other cultures are then evaluated. Thus.in our society, 
children from class and ethnic 3ub-cultures are defined, as being 'culturally 
deprived' -r in the sense of not being participants in the . dominant culture - i''": 
and as such are assumed to lack the linguistic and cognitive means to c a r r y ­
out abstract thought* ’;i*: < - t. ,j .*•*•-*1/- '*•
11 +
or.
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It can at least be argued that all cultures - class and ethnic - may have 
their own logics which are capable of grappling with abstract thought, indeed 
Labov has shown that black non-3tahdard English is perfectly capable of 
sophisticated argUmehi, logic and conceptualisation. Keddie therefore argues 
that "we in Britain should reconsider the notion that working class speech 
is unable to cope with what are felt to be high level abstractions and 
consider whether, like black non-standard English, it is better seen as a 
dialectical variation of standard English rather them a different kind of 
speech from that required for formal and logical thinking." (Keddie p.13) '
While, as Rosen says, it would be extremely foolhardy to claim that working 
class language was "as fine a tool as could be devised for communications 
and thinking", it does have its own strengths, in terms of which middle class 
language can be said to beJLacking, and does, as Bernstein himself points out 
"give acces's to ‘a vast potential of meanings", which have not been explored 
by researchers.. * «. !
Hie: structure pf the Audiences :•■*
Bernstein concludes his paper on 'Social Class, Language and Socialisation' 
with the claim that he has
"Tried to show how the class system acts upon the deep structure of 
communication in the process of socialisation."
Rosen remarks:
"Whatever else he has done, he has not j-me that - for the simple reason that 
he never examines the class system. By implication only, we are provided 
with a system consisting of two classes, called the working class and the 
Middle class. No further attempt is ma a at differentiation, whether in 
terras of history, traditions, job exper ence, ethnic origins, residential 
patterns, level of organisation and cla s consciousness." (L & C p.6)
He aska: . .
"How does the writer know about these fratures of working class life? Do his 
ideas derive from a study of workers in industry? Which industry? Where?
Or are we being offered a stereotype cf the unskilled worker assembled from 
\the descriptive literature of sociology?" (L & C, p.8)
£osen points out that Bernstein's theorv makes no differentiations for the 
Lfferent sectors of the working class - ignoring the fact that although 
members of this class share a 'common occupational function and social 
rtus - in the sense of having to sell choir labour power - the different 
sections of this class differ in very i. portant secondary characteristics, 
whiih will in turn affect how they use language.
Thus\he suggests that the kind of question we need to ask is:
8"What distinguishes the language of Liverpool dockers from that of Durham 
miners or Clydeside^shipbuilders or London railwaymen or Coventry car-workers?
Or for that matter, what distinguishes the language of Liverpool dockers from that 
of London dockers? If questions of this kind are not asked, then we take away 
from people their history, be they working class or middle class ... We have no 
right to assume a linguistic uniformity'based on general 'occupational function 
and status' •. H (L & C p-9) ' > (
He goes on to suggest that: /
The most articulate workers are those who have actively participated in the 
creation and maintenance,of- their own Organisations, and amongst these the most 
articulate will be ;those whdfin that'process have encountered and helped to 
formulate theories about society Wld how to change it." (L&C p.9) , 1
As he has earlier pointed out (p7>, in. Bernstein's theory : v ’\ "*•
"No attention is paid to that vast area of'critical working class experience, the. 
encounter with exjj^lqitation at the place.nf work and .the response tb it "
Nor .is attention paid to the socialising' influence of:
" .. the organisations created,by andtomintaihed by the working class themselves 
.. everything from political parties^-Trade Unions'and non-conformist chapels 
to brass bands and pigeon-racing clubs." : ■ '
The crucial relevance and influence of working class organisation can bt^  seen 
most clearly in the strike situation (cf.Benyon: 'Working* for Ford' p.27? & 
pp. 302-6) - where for employers.hoping to influence workers' decisions on a 
pay deal the hope must be that the decision';will be taken by each worker in 
isolation. Thus, during the 19^9 strike at Ford's Halewood, the employers 
sent a.letter to the homes of all employees, saying that "it seems a sensible 
idea to set out for you once again - so that you can read it in the calm of 
your own home - what the company regards as the" really crucial issues affecting 
all of us at this time."-(my emphasis). Following this a secret ballot produced 
acceptance of the pay offer, but the result of the ballot was overturned at a 
series of mass meetings.- The media 'explained' this by pointing to the 'emotional' 
nature of mass meetings, and claimed_jthat the men were afraid to oppose their 
leadership in such a situation, and were intimidated.s. As Benyon remarks: . .
"In finishing a.strike, workers have decided to go back into a plant and work 
on an assembly'line on a vast shop floor, alongside hundreds of other men.
Their survival -in that; .situation is tied up with relationship with those other meiw" 
On the basis of this real interdependence, these workers will tend towards the 
development of a 'collectivist' mode of thought, in terms of which the secret 
ballot is divisive - for it denies them access in the decision-making situation 
to the collectivity and thereby to themselves."
. j 1 Kir \ • ' i'-'
The above k-ihd of example could be fitted into a generalised model of the media 
audience where 'group affiliation' is seen as filtering or mediating the message 
to the individual and influencing his understanding of and response to it. But 
what is; actually needed is a much more highly differentiated model of the 
audience which distinguishes A. Between *;ne different dimensions of 'group 
affiliation' which may be relevant to an ndividual and on the basis of which he 
will be a participant in different codes and cultures, and also B. Between the 
specific contents of the shared codes and sub-cultures: primarily between situations 
where 'group affiliation' does act as a 'filter' between the message and the 
individual, in the sense that the shared ulturc of the group is dissonant with 
that of the media, and situations where '',roup affiliation' reinforces the 
message - where the group's culture is in xine with that of the media.
We must not see the audience as an undiff .rentiated mass but as a complex 
structure, made up of a number of overlap* _ng subgDoups, each with its own 
history and cultural traditions. While wi must steer clear of the dangers of 
a 'substantialist' mode of analysis which vould see 'culture' as automatically 
determined or generated by social position, we must investigate the sociological •
'  9 .
basis of socio-linguistic codes, sub cultures and ideologies. In this connection,., 
the primary factors we need to analyse are: . ’ . !
pngi tion in the class structure
+ Occupational differentes (As Labov says, our knowledge of the relationship
between language and work is meagre.)
Regional situation (Dialects) >1 f bur, ■*<,<•. i . i •
+ Differential residential patterns: urban/rural, etc. ~
Ethnic origin (Ethnic sub-cultures)
Age (Notions of '.youth culture* etc.)
. . . y ^  ^ * • t .,
Sex: How is the relationship of sex and class - the relationships of power 
between men and -women* ahd those between ruling class and working class - 
reflected in language? Are -the linguistic differences^ between men and women 
more significant than those between classes or regions? ..
i. |
Then we need to look at the way in which the influence of all these factors is
refracted through their influence on the level of education 'achieved' by
individuals, and then in turn, the. specific influence of education in 'distributing'
cultural codes and ebmjjbtencies throughout tfie society. , .....
, ■ , betS ’ • i t , i t : :/ ,
Beyond this we need to analyse the autonomous influence of historical, cultural 
and religious traditions, and the influence of an individual's membership of ” 
different groups and organisations which are the institutional bases of those 
traditions. • • ' -rf. «•
• • *. k'h y£ i ; It & i i
These factors, I would suggest, will be relevant 9^ the analysis (in terns of 
Saussure's distinction) at the level of language. “ Gigliol points out that:
"The relation between languages (and, by implication, socio-linguistic codes, 
sub-cultures and ideologies) and social groups cannot be ^gken for granted, but 
is a problem which must be ethnographically investigated" .
J  ' 'b a t r .o i t a o v t u  I lija Jk tr-jsrtfjo u rito  od da»>m t io i t i*  m .irio>iq -> r 
As we move from this level of analysis to an * ethnography of speaking' - i.e. 
a comparative analysis of speech events, of their elements and of the functions 
fulfilled by speech in particular settings - we begin to deal with the 
complications of the influence of specific social contexts on the 'realisation' in 
speech of basic language codes. Here the problems become enormously complicated, 
in terras for instance,-of the existence of a plurality of codes or code varieties 
within the same linguistic community, and the existence of rules by means of 
which anspeakef-selects one or another code as suitable for a particular social 
contextand the ongoing negotiations of these rules by participants in a social 
situation*,
§. A# * • . ; • l!':' : •' . ; . . ,.f t ■'
But what is crucial is that we should map -:11 these complications into a notion of 
a dominant cultural order. The plurality of cultural and sociolinguistic codes must 
not blind us to the fact that these codes -.-re structured in. dominance within the 
hegemony of the map of social reality draw., by the dominant/preferred meaning system.
As Parkin argues: "The major problem raise by the class differentiated view of 
the normative order is that of social contol. If the subordinate class were to 
subscribe .to a value system sharply distin uished from that of the dominant class, 
then the latter's normative control over t .e former would be seriously diminished.
In this situation the dominant class would nave to rely on physical coorcion as a 
substitute for moral suasion.. Thus, in s.cieties where the use or threatened use 
°f force does not appear to be the prevail ng strategy of social control, we are 
bound to have reservations about the valid ,y of a class differential model of the 
moral order."
13lt is here that Parkin's formulation of the problem provides us with a useful 
framework, although his formulation of the maps cf qraning in our society - in
f -rtns of a dominant value .'system, a s.ijfcjcrrj'iratc or negotiated value system, and
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audience, his schema provides us with the notion that a given section of the audience 
either shares, partly shares, or does not share the dominant code in which the 
message has been transmitted. Obviously, empirical work is needed to establish 
which sections of the audience actually do share which codes and meaning systems - 
but this work can most usefully be developed within the framework Parkin has set out.
The structuration of access to different codes and meaning systems; '
Parkin's notion of the 'negotiated' code can be seen to illuminate both Baudelot 
& Establet's wbrk on the position of working class children in school and Michael 
Mann's work on the position of industrial workers, in relation to the dominant 
ideology.
’ i .y ■ ‘ •' t -.
In both cases, the objective position of members of these groups in the social 
structure, which Baudelot & Establet phrase in terms of ’class instinct', is seen 
as inclining them away from an 'acceptance' of the dominant meaning system and 
towards a spontaneous, but anarchistically expressed and fragmented, sense of 
exploitation and opposition to this meaning system. It is in this context,
Baudelot & Establet suggest, that we should understand the 'truancy problem' and 
the 'discipline problem' schools - as expressions of resentment and opposition 
towards education as such - as instinctive forms of resistance to the dominant 
ideology transmitted by the education system.
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Michael Mann points out that:
"working class compliance is based on pragmatic acceptance of specific roles 
(because the individual concerned sees no real.istic alternative) rather than on 
any positive normative commitment to society whereby the working class might 
internalise the moral expectations of the ruling class and view their inferior 
position as 'legitimate' --  — 1-
And he goes on to argue that: "there is little truth in the claims of some Marxists 
that the working class is systematically and successfully indoctrinated with 
ruling class values ... It is not value consensus which keeps the working class 
compliant, but rather a lack of consensus in the crucial area where concrete 
experiences (of conflict & exploitation) and vague populism (widespread notions of 
'us' & 'them') might be tra^glated into radical politics .."
Thus as Stuart Hall argues:
"Decoding within the negotiated meaning system contains a mixture of adaptive and 
oppositional elements: it acknowledges the legitimacy of the hegemonic definitions 
to make the grand significations, while, at a more restricted, situational level, 
it makes its own ground rules, and operates with 'exceptions' to the rule. It 
accords the privileged position to the dominant definitions of events, whilst 
reserving the right to make a more negotiated application to 'local conditions', 
to its own more corporate positions."
This is well illustrated in Parkin's examp: is of industrial workers who may be 
willing, in the abstract, to endorse middle class criticisms of Trade Unions as 
having too much power, etc. - but who are j^rfectly willing to use what power they 
have as organized Trade Unionists in furtht" ance of their own particular demands. 
Likewise, Mann points out that while an industrial worker is likely to be cynical 
about his chances for 'getting on', he is 1 kely to be much more optimistic about 
the possibilities for working class people to 'get on ' in Capitalist society in / 
general. •. ' /
' • /
The question is why the 'syndrome of grumbl ng dissent' among the working class 
only produces oppositional views on concrete issues, and is not translated into a 
systematic sense of opposition to the established social order. The answer would 
seem to be best given in terms of (,a) the restricted mode of understanding of society 
that the working class is able to gain from the dominant meaning system made 
available through the education system and \.»ie media and (b) the lack of access to 
any radical ideblogy which might enable, the different sections of the working class 
to generalise their specific demands and gr evances into a distinct form of 
class consciousness.
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With reference to (a) Mueller argues that: "Adequate concepts and paradigms
that are necessary for the understanding of politics are excluded from the 
public language" which is made available through the education and media systems 
and that "on the class level the language used results in an incapacity to locate 
oneself in history and society". Thus, he argues, the subordinate class is unable 
"to generate from its own bases symbols and ideas contrary to the dominant ones 
and that while "they may or may not agree with a given message ... they have no 
alternative interpretation at their disposal, if they have no code representing 
their own interests."
In the education system, for the majority of kids, the transmission of the 
dominant ideology takes place by not referring to anything with which they are 
familiar - the school apparatus officially puts working class feelings, experience 
and ideology off the map. In this way workers' children are presented with a 
vacuum at precisely the point at which they ought to be able to learn to interpret 
and understand their own class experiencet in school the social order is presented 
generally as benevolent; politics is presented as a set of technical processes, 
rather than as a class struggle over power and resources - no means is provided of 
understanding the real conflicts in society.
Thus the dominant meaning system does not provide the concepts that might enable 
the working class to interpret the reality it actually experiences. Society is 
presented in a reified way, and no sense is given of any overall alternative possible 
set of social arrangements. This can be seen clearly in the media's dehistoricised 
presentation of the news as a se^es of 'events' - which are not related to 
underlying structural processes. (b) can best be reformulated at the question of 
'which groups have access to which codes?'
MacIntyre argues, in Causality and Social Science, that: "The limits of what I 
can do intentionally are set by the limits of the descriptions available to me; 
and the descriptions available to me are those current in the social group to 
which I belong ... If the limits of action are the limits of description, then to 
analyse the ideas current in a society (or subgroup of that society), is also to 
discern the limits within which rational, intended action necessarily moves in 
that society."
A person's conception of what he should do, whether as a matter of explicit choice, 
or. more commonly as a pattern of habitual.action, will be largely determined by his 
self-concept ion or identity, which will be largely provided by the meaning system 
to which the individual in question adheres. (Although one need not assume that 
members of a social group only have access to one code - they may have access to 
several codes or meaning-systems which they can choose to 'operate' in different 
situations, and indeed, members of different groups may have access to the same code.
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Berger and Luckman speak of the emergence .n our society of the 'individualist' 
as a social type, who "has at least the po'" ibility of migration between a. 
number of available worlds and who has deliberately and awarely constructed a 
'self' cut of the material provided by a nu'ber of available identities. "For 
such a person," they argue, "alternative rea ities and identities (as offered by 
different meaning systems) appear as subjective options."
However, for most members of our society, the options available are severely 
limited by their social context - Parkin ar ues that: 20
"Clearly, values are not imposed on men in me mechanistic way. Men also impose 
their will by selecting, as it were, from t’e range of values that any complex 
society generates. At the same time individuals do not construct their social 
worlds in terms of a wholly personal vision and without drawing heavily on the 
organised concepts which are part of a publ:meaning system.. Variations in the 
structure of attitudes of groups or individuals .. are thus to some extent 
dependent on differences in access to those meaning systems."
The question of the extent to which a different or'wider range of meaning 
systems is available to different social groups or classes can perhaps fruitfully 
be seen as a reformulation of the problem investigated by Mannheim of the extent 
to which social groups differ in their capacity to transcend the limitations imposed 
on their viewpoints by their social position - for most members of the subordinate 
classes the meaning systems publicly available to them are probably all within 
a fairly narrow range.
The question also relates to Parsons (sic) concern with 'badly socialised' 
individuals - i.e. those who for some reason or another do not act in accordance 
with the tenets of the dominant meaning system - who Parsons sees as a possible 
source of social change. For Parsons these persons are likely to be distributed 
randomly throughout the social order, but Marcuse attempts a more systematic explan­
ation of how persons in certain defined;social positions (in his explanation those 
marginal to the process of production) are more likely both to come into contact 
with radical alternative meaning systems and to provide a social base from which 
an oppositional counter ideology might begin to be generated.
•#*-
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Macfntyre points out that:
"Becoming class conscious is like learning a foreign language: learning a whole 
new way of conceptualising one's social situation and giving entirely different 
meanings to one's actions."
Jn this connection Parkin states:'
"Political deviance is manifested in electoral support for socialism on the part of 
members of any social stratum ... Socialist voting can be regarded as a symbolic 
act of deviance from the dominant values of British Capitalist society, whilst 
Conservative voting may be thought of as a symbolic re-affirmation of such values." 
Moreover he argues that "electoral support for socialism will occur predominantly 
where individuals cure involved in ’ normative sub-systems which serve as 'barriers' 
to the dominant values of society .... The political and social values of 
Conservatism are more successfully resisted by those who have access to an 
alternative normative system such as is typically created in working class 
communities" - Political deviance is then, "not a function simply of class 
position, but of the availability of normative sub-systems which deviate from the 
overall value system in politically significant ways.
i:
CONCLUSION
Placing the problem of the situation of the audience in relation to the message 
i* the context of the problem of hegemony, I w'ould argue that what is needed is 
the development of a 'cultural map' of the audience so that we can begin to see 
which classes, sections of classes and subgroups share which cultural codes and 
meaning systems, to what extent - so that we can then see: how these codes determine 
the decoding of the messages of the media, what degree of 'distance' different 
sections of the audience, have from the don.nant meanings encoded in the messages, 
add moreover which sections of the audienc . have access to any alternative or 
oppositional codes or meaning-systems. \
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